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DRAFT – forthcoming in Schill (ed), International Investment Law and
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), c. 20.

Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the
Rule of Law
Gus Van Harten *

I. Introduction

Investment treaty arbitration is often promoted as a fair, rules-based system and, in
this respect, as something that advances the rule of law. 1 This claim is undermined,

*
1

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada.
This rule of law-based advocacy is widespread in academic, practitioner, policy, and popular

literature on investment arbitration. Examples are found in the work of senior figures in the
arbitration world, such as Charles Brower, Jan Paulsson, and Thomas Wälde, and in that of
commentators who are (like the current author) more junior, including Ian Laird, Stephan Schill,
and Todd Weiler, each of whom has advocated investment treaty arbitration by drawing on values
of (usually substantive) fairness and the rule of law and by connecting these values to the use of
international arbitration to resolve investor-state disputes. For instance, the late Thomas Wälde
described investment treaty arbitration as part of a wider post-war effort ‘to create equal rules for
all, to tame the natural asymmetry of sheer power with rules and procedure’ and indeed ‘to create
prosperity and peace to prevent a new Hitler or Stalin from emerging’: TW Wälde, ‘The Present
State of Research Carried Out by the English-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and
Research’ in P Kahn and TW Wälde (eds), New Aspects of International Investment Law (2007)
63, 95; J Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005) 265; CN Brower and LA Steven,
‘Who Then Should Judge? Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11’
(2001) 2 Chi JIL 193; CN Brower and SW Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law’ (2009) 9 Chi JIL 471; SW Schill, ‘Fair and
Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law’, Institute
for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2006/6 (Global Administrative Law Series) 4,
31, 36; IA Laird, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little’ (2001) 2 Chi JIL 223, 229; T Weiler,
‘NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International Economic Law’ (2002) 36 Can
Bus LJ 405.
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however, by procedural and institutional aspects of the system that suggest it will tend
to favour claimants and, more specifically, those states and other actors that wield
power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole. On the other hand, other
states and investors (especially those that bring claims against a powerful state) can
expect to be disadvantaged.

To the degree that such perceptions of bias have currency, as is argued here, this
arises primarily from the use of arbitration to decide finally questions of public law. 2
First, the novel situation in which claims can be brought by only one class of parties,
and only the other class can be found to have violated the treaty, provides investment
treaty arbitrators (including those who are state-appointed) with an incentive to favour
claimants in order to advance the interests of the industry and their position within it.
Secondly, the fact that arbitrators are appointed on a case-by-case basis raises the
concern that they will seek to please those who hold power in the key appointing
authorities and in the arbitration industry. In both respects, the absence of institutional
safeguards of impartiality and independence—especially those of security of tenure,
prohibitions on outside remuneration, and an objective method of case-by-case
assignment—undermines the normative basis for the adjudicative system’s
displacement of other modes of decision-making.

Those who promote investment treaty arbitration usually do so in conjunction with a
robust criticism of both domestic courts (as apparently or actually biased against
foreign investors) and international diplomacy (as ‘political’ rather than governed by
law). 3 Investment treaty arbitration is said to address the limitations of these other
forms of decision-making by laying out predictable rules to govern relations between
2

JH Cohen and K Dayton, ‘The New Federal Arbitration Law’ (1926) 12 Va LR 265, 281:

‘Arbitration . . . is not the proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving
constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes’; Julius Cohen was the principal
drafter of what became the US Federal Arbitration Act.
3

See the literature cited in n 1 above. Contrast the discussion of ‘political jurisprudence’ in M

Shapiro, ‘Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or Stare Decisis?’
(1965) 2 Law in Transition Quarterly 134, 134, courts ‘are part of government, they make public
policy, and they are an integral part of the law-making and enforcement process which is the
central focus of political activity’.
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investors and states and by allowing investors to bring claims against states for
resolution by a fair process. An initial difficulty with this position, not addressed here
but worth reflecting upon, is that investment treaties generally do not establish
coherent, non-contradictory rules that are capable of being known and thus followed
on a reasonably reliable basis, but rather a set of broadly-framed ideals that have in
turn been assigned different and at times conflicting 4 meanings when interpreted by
arbitrators. It is an open question whether a lack of clarity or coherence in the
standards that regulate states and that implicate investors can be said to undermine the
objective of a rules-based system; 5 one’s answer may depend for instance on whether
one regards standards or rules as more effective at offering guidance in the
circumstances 6 and whether one concludes that states should in the present context
enjoy the benefits of clarity or predictability as elements of the rule of law. A more
immediate concern, though, arises from another aspect of the association of
investment treaty arbitration with the rule of law. The problem is that the system
appears not to deliver on a core component of fair process, especially the demands of
independence (and impartiality) 7 in the final judgment of public law.

4

SD Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public

International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Ford LR 1521; WW Burke-White,
‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID
System’ (2008) 3 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 199, 209–28.
5

BZ Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 131–3.

6

A Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 U Chi LR 1175; J Braithwaite,

‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal
Philosophy 54.
7

To avoid repetition, references to judicial ‘independence’ should be read as ‘impartiality and

independence’ on the basis that the latter is a precondition for the former. See P Pasquino,
‘Prolegomena to a Theory of Judicial Power: The Concept of Judicial Independence in Theory and
History’ (2003) 2 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 11, 25: ‘. . .
independence of the judicial power has always to be understood as an instrument to achieve the
goal of impartiality; and that independence has to be conceived of as neutrality, and absence of the
subordination of the judge a) from the parties to the conflict, b) from any other power interested in
a given resolution of the conflict, and as far as possible c) from the bias of passions and partiality
of the judge himself or herself’ (emphasis in the original).
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Adjudication is often said to advance the rule of law. Needless to say, the rule of law
is a concept that is given different meanings, sometimes divergent. However, the
concept is widely regarded to include at the procedural level the requirement for a fair
decision-making process in circumstances where a government decision affects
significantly an individual or specific group, based on the provision of adequate
notice and an opportunity to reply, and of a decision by an independent and impartial
decision-maker. Just how the rule of law should apply to the benefit of states, as
opposed to individuals, where they are subject to review at the international level, is a
challenging question 8 and it may be that the implementation of relevant principles
should vary where a decision affects people or groups not directly but rather through
the vehicle of their state. 9 Yet where it is claimed that the shift to adjudication
advances the rule of law, it is also pertinent to ask whether and how procedural
components of that concept are reflected in the particular form of adjudication that is
on offer. In this chapter, the argument is that investment treaty arbitration falls short
in institutional terms due to its unique combination of arbitration and public law, its
asymmetrical 10 claims structure, its reliance on executive officials to make case-bycase appointments, and its attenuation of judicial oversight. The focus as such is not

8

J Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’, NYU

Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No 09-01 (January 2009); S Chesterton, ‘An
International Rule of Law?’, NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No 09-11 (April
2008) 34–8; J Crawford, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law
Review 3, 8; D Zolo, ‘The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal’ in P Costa and D Zolo (eds), The
Rule of Law (2007) 40–1.
9

Waldron, (n 8 above) 13: ‘The real purpose of international law and, in my view, of the rule

of law in the international realm is not the protection of sovereign states but the protection of the
populations committed to their charge.’
10

Referring specifically to the fact that only one class of parties, investors, brings the claims

and only the other class, states, can be ordered to pay damages for a violation of the treaty. Thus,
this use of ‘asymmetry’ differs from other formal uses of the term (as well as from references to
asymmetries of power; eg J Atik, ‘Repenser NAFTA Chapter 11: A Catalogue of Legitimacy
Critiques’ (2004) 3 Asper Rev Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 215, 220–1) such as in the case of the onesidedness of a domestic arbitration agreement between a large firm and an individual consumer in
which only the individual submits to compulsory arbitration (frequently in a forum that is
favourable to the firm) while the firm retains its right to go to court.
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on actual bias in investment treaty arbitration but, more appropriately, on institutional
and procedural aspects of the system that raise suspicions of bias.

II. Context

A. The Uniqueness of Investment Treaty Arbitration

To elaborate on the procedural concerns in investment treaty arbitration it is necessary
to outline how the system intertwines public law and international adjudication in
order to subject questions of sovereign authority and public budgeting—also referred
to here as matters of public law and policy—to international review. What is unique
about investment treaty arbitration is the way in which it engages issues of public law,
relative to other forms of international adjudication. The system is international and
subject to public international law because it is established by treaties between states.
Unlike domestic public law, therefore, it is established by agreements between public
entities that do not interact with each other within a hierarchical system of sovereign
authority and that are not subject to a classical separation of powers. 11 Investment
treaties are typically concluded by executive officials of states who present an agreed
treaty text for adoption by their respective legislatures or other domestic authorities,
often without extensive legislative deliberation and debate.12 Likewise, the operation
of the system relies extensively on processes of international adjudication to interpret
and apply the treaties in specific cases and thus to determine the appropriate meaning
to be given to silence or ambiguity. The law-making function of the relevant
sovereigns 13 is exercised primarily by the executive officers who draft the treaties and
secondarily by the arbitrators who interpret and apply them. Domestic legislatures are
minor players, relative to the domestic context where public law is elaborated in the
national constitution and in detailed statutes and subsidiary instruments, where the
11

J Brunnee and SJ Toope, ‘An Interactional Theory of International Legal Obligation’,

University of Toronto Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 08-16 (2008) 22.
12

Increasingly there are exceptions to this, as reportedly in the case of the Uruguay Congress’

ratification of that country’s BIT with the US in 2006. D Vis-Dunbar, ‘Uruguay surprises with
ratification of contentious U.S. investment treaty’ Investment Treaty News, 12 January 2006.
13

J Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Research

Paper No 08-50 (November 2008) 29–30.
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key role of the courts (outside constitutional law) is to formulate an understanding of
legislative intent and interpret the law accordingly, and where the legislature has the
opportunity to override or ‘dialogue’ with the courts as it sees fit. 14

Nevertheless, investment treaty arbitration resembles judicial review in domestic
public law to a greater extent than do other modern forms of international
adjudication. In this respect, it differs from others contexts in which international
arbitration is used. Both international commercial arbitration and inter-state
adjudication, for instance, are used typically to resolve disputes arising from
reciprocal relationships between the disputing parties (whether between private
parties—including, potentially, the state acting in a private capacity—or between
sovereigns). Reflecting this formal reciprocity, either disputing party is capable of
bringing a claim against the other and of possessing the same legal rights and
obligations. In investment treaty arbitration, on the other hand, the disputes arise
between a private party and a state in relation to the latter’s assumption and assertion
of sovereign authority. Thus, the disputes arise in the context of a regulatory rather
than a reciprocal relationship, turning as such on the idea that states may exercise
authority and hold responsibilities that no private party can possess.

Investment treaty arbitration also differs from other treaty-based adjudicative regimes,
including other international courts and tribunals, by its combination of five
characteristics. First, individuals can bring international claims directly against the
state in the context of the regulatory rather than a commercial relationship. Secondly,
the state’s consent to arbitration is generalized and prospective, extending in effect to
any individual or organization that qualifies as an investor under the treaty; it is not
limited to disputes arising from a specific relationship or historical event. Thirdly, the
primary remedy is a damages award against the state; this is important because, in
public law, state liability is usually circumscribed in the light of its implications for
government planning and budgeting. Fourthly, unlike other treaties that allow
14

PW Hogg and AA Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or

Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 75; H Koh, ‘Transnational Public Law Litigation’ (1991) 100 Yale LJ 2347, 2371; RB
Ahdieh, ‘Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts’ (2004) 79 NYU
LR 2029.
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individual claims, investment treaties remove the investor’s duty to exhaust local
remedies, thus causing the system to eclipse the customary role of domestic legal
systems, especially domestic courts, in mediating between the international sphere
and domestic regulatory relationships. Fifthly, unlike other decisions or awards in
public law, investment treaty awards are widely enforceable in many countries with
limited opportunity for judicial review. As a result, the arbitrators are authorized to
resolve core questions of public law without the prospect of review by an independent
court, whether domestic or international.

Considering these features, it is apparent just how far the system has moved from the
realm of inter-state adjudication to one in which an international adjudicator can
review intensively governmental choices of states. 15 The system delegates to
arbitrators the power to define what activities are sovereign and what are not, to
decide whether sovereign actors have acted improperly and unlawfully, and to direct
the payment of public money or the seizure of public assets on behalf of private
actors. The system subjects states to intensive review by tribunals that are established
(usually) in a foreign jurisdiction and backed by the coercive power of other states
over foreign-owned assets within their own territory. For these reasons, investment
treaty arbitration is probably the closest the world has come to an international
adjudicative body with compulsory jurisdiction over claims by individuals against
states in the regulatory sphere. That is, it is the closest we have come to an
international constitutional or administrative court if we understand such a body to be
one that would allow individuals directly to initiate adjudicative review of the state’s
sovereign activity and to obtain a binding determination of the legality of state
conduct as well as a precise and powerful remedy. 16 Yet ironically the claims are not
resolved by a court at all. They are resolved instead by a system of adjudication that
originated in dispute resolution between private parties and between public entities,
and that evolved to endorse and satisfy the demands of party autonomy before those
of open and independent judging in the liberal democratic tradition.

15

A Chayes, ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1976) 89 Harv LR 1281.

16

Ahdieh (n 14 above) 2057.
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B. A Caution on Domestic Analogies

The uniqueness of investment treaty arbitration makes it useful but also questionable
to examine analogies in domestic law so as to illuminate the system and its intended
meaning. 17 The challenge goes beyond the usual hazards of legal transplantation, such
as the difficulty of reducing different rules and processes to particular forms despite
their varying contexts and histories, the risk of losing sight of the details while
searching for a general unifying position, or the possibility that an outsider may
discover and borrow only what he or she prefers to find in a particular jurisdiction.
These pitfalls are always important to keep in mind. 18 They highlight the importance
of examining sources in public international law—above all where they engage the
regulatory relationship in ways comparable to investment treaty arbitration—with at
least as much priority as domestic sources. Likewise, there are limitations to the
utility of domestic law and domestic legal systems as a source of guidance to interpret
investment treaties. For example, if one were to look to these sources for an indication
of how to interpret a particular treaty, one should presumably begin (and arguably
end) with the domestic law of the relevant state parties. 19

Beyond the question of appropriate sources, there is a further challenge in an attempt
to use domestic analogues to inform adjudicative decision-making on the international
plane (and perhaps vice versa). An adjudicator who exercises authority over the
public law and policy of a state, pursuant to a broadly-framed treaty, must recognize
that his or her own sovereign decision-making role is in key respects more
determinative than that of a domestic judge. The international adjudicator must often
decide the terms of an inter-state agreement in the absence of a mature jurisprudence
(whether coming to maturity before or after states have concluded the treaty) and in
the absence of a reasonable prospect of review and amendment of the treaty by the
state parties. But, faced with individual claims in the absence of a duty to exhaust
local remedies, the adjudicator will review sovereign choices in much the same
17

Brunnee and Toope (n 11 above) 4 and 6.

18

P Costa and D Zolo, ‘Preface’ in Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (eds), The Rule of Law

(2007) xii–xiii.
19

Differently, Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public

Law—An Introduction’, Chapter 1 above.
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manner that a domestic court reviews legislative, judicial, or executive decisions.
Thus, as in domestic judicial review, it may be necessary for the adjudicator to
distinguish between different decision-makers and the level of generality of the
measures they have established in order to determine, among other things, the
appropriateness of deference. 20

The present study seeks to examine investment treaty arbitration from a perspective of
public law that is informed by experiences in both domestic and international law. It
does not look in detail at the laws of a specific domestic jurisdiction, however, nor
does it seek to clarify treaty language or develop general principles of law to inform
the interpretive process in investment arbitration. Rather, the aim here is to highlight
certain principles or ‘grounding values’ 21 of public law—arising from procedural and
institutional components of the rule of law—and to examine investment treaty
arbitration in the light of these principles. 22 The implication is not that international
adjudication should precisely replicate features of domestic law 23 but rather that a
focus on procedural and institutional concerns may offer a more focused framework
for using the rule of law as an evaluative concept in the international sphere. 24

III. The Issue of the Rule of Law

A. The Emphasis on Procedural Fairness

20

JA King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28 OJLS 409; W Burke-

White, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’, Chapter 22
below; M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Democracy Encounters International Law: Terms of
Engagement’ NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No 47 (2006) 19.
21

Zolo (n 8 above) 18–19.

22

EA Young, ‘Toward a Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication’ (2007) 57 Emory

Law Journal 93, 114; D Raab and H Bevers, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Separation
of Powers’ (2006) 3 Int Org LR 93, 98–9.
23

N Krisch, ‘Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition’, LSE Law, Society

and Economic Working Paper 10/2009 (2009) 12–13.
24

Waldron (n 13 above) 4–5.

<Schill, Chapter 20>

10
Those who invoke the rule of law often do so in order to defend one or another form
of adjudication as a preferred method of decision-making. 25 This implies that the
relevant form of adjudication is itself consistent with and measurable against criteria
associated with the rule of law. 26 Speaking generally, the rule of law is important
because of the values it conveys and because it calls on those involved in decisionmaking to take values seriously. 27 But it is a malleable concept that is easily
employed as a political slogan, marketing device, or simple ‘Hurrah!’.28 It is therefore
prudent to consider the purposes of one who invokes the rule of law and the particular
glean that has been given to the term. Like freedom or equality or democracy, the rule
of law can mean essentially 29 different things to different people, and may be used for
obfuscation and manipulation as well as for clarification or guidance. 30

In this chapter, the focus is on procedural and institutional rather than substantive
elements of the rule of law. The focus is also on the fairness of adjudication rather
than law-making generally. 31 This focus has been arrived at in an effort to limit
engagement with wider debates about investment treaty arbitration in which the rule
of law is given a prescriptive meaning and used as platform for substantive comment
on investor-state relations. These substantive invocations of the rule of law have
different iterations but in the present context they typically advocate a limited role for
the state, based on an espoused preference for fairness, individual freedom, and
market efficiency. With this usually comes a strong dose of scepticism about the
25

N Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public

Policy (1994).
26

Young (n 22 above) 94.

27

R Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 Col LR 1,

56; N Walker, ‘The Rule of Law and the EU: Necessity’s Mixed Value’ in G Palombella and N
Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (2009) 120–1.
28

S Beaulac, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in Palombella and Walker (n 27

above) 222–3; J Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)’
(2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137, 139–40; Zolo (n 8 above) 5.
29

Waldron (n 28 above) 149–53.

30

AC Hutchison and P Monahan, ‘Introduction’ in AC Hutchison and P Monahan (eds), The

Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (1987) ix: ‘[The rule of law’s] very generality is the reason for its
durability and contestibility . . . it is the will-o’-the-wisp of political history’.
31

On the latter, see D Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization (2008) 206.
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motivations and capacity of government to promote social welfare. In terms of
international review, the state’s role in modern society is typically not said to warrant
deference from international adjudicators on the grounds that domestic governments
are better able to make regulatory choices or that they have a stronger claim to
legitimacy. Indeed, states are at times framed as hostile and illegitimate, and their
review by arbitrators as aimed at ameliorating these failings and advancing business
freedom as a higher goal: ‘the role of investment treaties is to provide an external
anchor for economic policies that are in the long-term sensible for national economies
and the global economy’, as Thomas Wälde put it. 32 By this version of the rule of law,
then, it is investment arbitrators who are to decide whether a state’s decisions are
‘sensible’ and to award compensation to business where the state has been found to
have encroached on some substantive priority.

As an aside, one criticism of this type of rule of law advocacy for the system is that it
constructs an artificial contest between ‘misplaced dichotomies’ or caricatures and, as
such, may miss a good part of current debates about the appropriate role of
governments and markets. 33 Its invocation of the rule of law evokes Friedrich
Krachtowil’s ‘frightening prospect of a rule of lawyers who function as “experts” by
emasculating politics’. 34 Positioned in contrast to approaches to investment rules that
aim ‘to freeze politics and inhibit the imagination of alternative futures’, David
Schneiderman refers to (and criticizes) Franz Neumann’s ‘social rule of law’ whose
function was ‘to uncover and rectify socioeconomic relations of domination and
subordination’. 35 For present purposes, what this highlights is simply a selectivity on
the part of many rule-of-law proponents of investment treaty arbitration. It is dubious
to claim that the rule of law is clearly aligned with any one set of answers to core
32

Wälde (n 1 above) 104.

33

F Kratochwil, ‘Has the “Rule of Law” become a “Rule of Lawyers”?’ in Palombella and

Walker, (n 27 above) 193. Many who support an active role for the state in economic development
also emphasize the role for markets in disciplining economic actors, sparking innovation, and
channelling productivity; those who promote foreign investment protection often also recognize a
role for regulation and indeed for democratic representation in allowing markets to function and in
balancing profit-seeking against other social priorities.
34

Kratochwil (n 33 above) 194.

35

Schneiderman (n 31 above) 207-8. See Franz Neumann, The Rule of Law (1986).
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substantive questions—whether governments should pursue certain outcomes;
whether individual rights or interests should take precedence over community
concerns; how ideals like democracy, justice, and efficiency should be balanced;
whether the mediation of conflicting rights and interests is best resolved through
adjudication—because these are among the most contested elements of the rule of the
law, 36 leading to myriad thick notions of the concept. 37 There is simply no accepted
understanding of what the rule of law means substantively in terms of the role of the
state in modern society (or even whether and to what extent the concept extends to
notions of substantive justice 38 or whether it refers to a process of reasoning about the
normative basis for law) 39 . It is thus questionable to invoke the concept in a
substantively prescriptive way without acknowledging the underlying debates.

Partly in an effort to sidestep much of the debate about the substantive choices of
states in their regulatory relations with investors, this chapter focuses on procedural
aspects of the rule of law. The aim, informed by Judith Shklar’s lively sojourn
through theoretical work on the rule of law (contrasting especially with Friedrich
Hayek and Roberto Unger), is to avoid treating the concept ‘as a football in a game
between friends and enemies of free-market liberalism’. 40 Jeremy Waldron has
observed that the procedural content of the rule of law is less widely debated in
36

cf Wälde (n 1 above), to eg WW Bishop, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1961) 59 Mich

LR 553, 553; D Kinley, ‘Human Rights, Globalization and the Rule of Law: Friends, Foes or
Family?’ (2002–03) 7 UCLA JIL & FA 239, 249, 260; M Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and
Human Rights (1982) 162; JB Weinstein, ‘The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For
the People’ (2008) 30 Cardozo Law Review 1, 33. See also Schneiderman (n 31 above) 207;
Tamanaha (n 5 above) ch 8.
37

J Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in Hutchison and Monahan (n 30 above) 1;

A Hutchison, ‘The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts’ in D Dyzenhaus (ed),
Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (1999) 199; Chesterton (n 8 above) 13–14.
38

P Bergling, Rule of Law on the International Agenda (2006) 16.

39

Brunnee and Toope (n 11 above) 11–12, 18.

40

Shklar (n 37 above) 16; it is notable that Shklar has been widely misquoted as having

claimed in this work that the ‘“Rule of Law” has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse
and general over-use’ (p 1); while Shklar mentioned this at the outset of this work as one position,
she did not adopt it as her own and indeed described the position as ‘irrelevant’ from a historical
perspective.
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academic circles than are substantive notions, and yet it is more widely discussed in
public discourse. 41 Perhaps this indicates a greater level of agreement on what the rule
of law should mean procedurally, even if procedural fairness is itself a flexible
concept (and even if the degree of fairness that a decision-making process demands
may vary according to the significance of the decision for those affected, the purpose
of the regulatory scheme and the role of the decision-maker within it, the historical
practices of the relevant body and jurisdiction, and so on). No doubt, the requirements
of independence must also accommodate a range of institutional and regulatory
settings for decision-making. 42 Even so, in the light of the common tendency to
associate investment treaty arbitration with the rule of law, it is pertinent to examine
the system itself in terms of the procedural elements of the concept.

It could be that expectations of procedural fairness should be tempered where it is a
state rather than an individual that is said to have been disadvantaged by apparent bias
in international adjudication (although, to be clear, my own argument here is that both
some investors and some states are disadvantaged by unfairness in investment treaty
arbitration, while others benefit). The impetus for demands of fair process emerge
historically from manifold encroachments of state power on individuals,
encroachments that demand that decision-makers be bound by law and, alongside this,
that courts be insulated from improper influence. 43 The rule of law concept evolved as
a framework for protecting individuals from the state, and foreign investors (and other
foreign nationals) are of course vulnerable to state abuse. In the light of this, there are
important questions about the place of the rule of law in the international sphere. 44
With respect to investment treaty arbitration, for example, various questions arise
when one seeks to apply a general concept rooted in the relationship between states
41

Waldron (n 13 above) 8–9.

42

eg it is widely accepted that international commercial arbitration would lose much of its

utility if it were subjected to judicial requirements of impartiality and independence, although the
issue of impartiality and independence may arise in terms of the role of judicial oversight to
ensure a fair process. N Japaridze, ‘Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice
with Preserving the Nature of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 36 Hofstra Law
Review 1415, 1445–6.
43

Waldron (n 8 above) 3.

44

Tamanaha (n 5 above) ch 10.
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and individuals to the international review of state regulation of private actors, given
that neither the analogy of individual-to-state nor that of individual-to-firm
necessarily holds. 45

Yet there are also compelling reasons to expect a high level of independence, and
probably other elements of procedural fairness, 46 in investment treaty arbitration. This
expectation serves to protect investors and states, but also to support the confidence of
the public and of those not represented directly in the adjudicative process but
nevertheless affected by it. For one, the use of adjudication to make decisions almost
always carries a very high expectation of procedural fairness, including in
international arbitration. 47 Moreover, the process here is not simply adjudicative but
also both compulsory and exceptionally final in its resolution of public law and its
decision-making about state liability. There is limited judicial oversight by domestic
courts (and none by any international court) and so little opportunity for the system to
piggyback on the institutional independence of established judiciaries through an
45

Waldron (n 8 above) 9, 11; Waldron (n 28 above) 18, 24–5.

46

Tamanaha (n 5 above) 133–5. For instance, in terms of the requirements of notice and an

opportunity for reply, individuals or groups whose rights or interests (eg reputational) are at stake
in the resolution of investor claims—as well as the interests of other levels of government whose
decisions are implicated—have no way to obtain third party status in investment treaty arbitration
as would typically be the case in domestic judicial review. An opportunity may exist for such
parties to obtain amicus standing at the tribunal’s discretion but this does not amount to full party
standing with the regular array of participatory rights. As a result, such parties may be denied
notice of matters affecting their interests or decisions as well as an opportunity to reply before the
decision-maker. In this respect, the selectivity of the individualization of claims in investment
treaty arbitration relegates others who are not investors, but are nonetheless affected by investorstate arbitration, to a subsidiary status. See also Alessandra Asteriti and Christian J Tams,
‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’,
Chapter 25 below.
47
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appellate process. Also, investment treaty arbitration involves not only the review of
decisions that affect the claimant in a specific and discrete way. It extends to
polycentric legislative, judicial, and executive decisions and often engages matters of
general significance. The redirection of public funds to private actors impacts on
those who would benefit from government programmes that are no longer affordable
and on those who would benefit from regulatory activity that has been disrupted or
deterred. 48 As recognized in domestic law, state liability raises significant concerns
about regulatory deterrence, 49 even if the fiscal and regulatory impacts of investment
arbitration are difficult to isolate and measure. 50 These aspects of the system—its
form, its determinativeness, its purpose, and its outcomes—indicate a need for robust
assurances of independence. One could defend an arrangement that lacked such
assurances on other grounds, by characterizing it, for instance, as a realist bargain, fair
or unfair, between states, 51 or by conceding simply that in the present context
‘domination [is] shedding its legitimating rationalizations’. 52 However, if one asserts
that investment treaty arbitration offers a fair, rules-based, and thus superior method
of decision-making, then the system is appropriately held to a high standard of
independence.

This focus on process does not mean that the rule of law should be stripped of all
substantive meaning. There are areas in which the line between process and substance
is difficult to draw. 53 It is often said that the rule of law precludes a legislature from
enacting laws that delegate authority or regulate conduct using vague language
48

Burke-White (n 4 above) 200–1.

49

Anne van Aaken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and

National State Liability: A Functional and Comparative View’, Chapter 23 below; C Harlow,
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50
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EA Posner and JC Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ (2005) 93 Cal LR
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because this gives executive officials too much discretion over how their authority
should be exercised and does not provide sufficient guidance to regulated actors. 54
The rule of law is also widely understood to include substantive notions of fairness, of
which courts are the guardians, even if questions of content remain highly contested.
Courts are also usually expected to ensure that statutory decision-makers respect the
boundaries of the delegation of their authority and that individuals are protected from
arbitrary treatment by public officials. 55 These elements reflect a thin version of the
rule of law, one that ‘upholds and supports diversity in moral and political ends’, 56
but with a substantive quality nonetheless.57 Further, courts have at times asserted
their authority to protect individuals from egregious treatment by the state—detention
in degrading conditions, for example—on the basis that it violates fundamental
values, even in the face of the clear will of the legislature. 58 Yet, when reviewing
substantive decisions by other state actors, courts also usually take care to avoid
intervening in matters that are appropriately left to decision-makers which are more
representative, more expert, or otherwise more able than the courts. 59

B. The Role of Judicial Independence

A discussion of the relationship between the rule of law and fairness may refer to lawmaking itself, to decision-making, or to the separation of judicial from other state
functions. Fuller’s approach to the rule of law, for example, identified characteristics
that constitute laws as general rules and that allow those who are subject to the law to

54
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rule of law that should not necessarily apply to benefit states as ‘agencies’ of international law,
with particular reference to international human rights, because of the difficulty of predicting all
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follow it. Laws that met certain criteria 60 were said by Fuller to be consistent with the
rule of law in a formal sense although the law might be put to a range of purposes and
lead to varying outcomes. According to Lacey: 61

Fuller’s was not a dogmatic, substantive natural law position: rather, it was a
position which built out from certain valued procedural tenets widely
associated with the rule of law . . . It was this universal ‘inner morality of law’
which provided the necessary connection between law and morality, and not
the ‘external’ or substantive morality which infused the content of law in
different ways in different systems.

Fuller’s template applies to law-making but is also relevant to decision-making in
specific cases or disputes. Any examination of the fairness of a process of decisionmaking must account for the role and character of that process and its implications for
those who are affected by it. Based on ancient sources, procedural fairness in
decision-making entails two key principles. First is that of audi alterem partem, ‘hear
the other side’, referring to the need to provide notice and an opportunity to reply. 62
Second is the principle of nemo judex sua causa, ‘no one shall judge his own cause’,
referring to the requirement for an unbiased decision-maker. 63 Thus, if the rule of law
is invoked to refer to fairness in decision-making, then the independence of the
decision-maker is an integral consideration, even if the ways in which independence
is advanced may vary.
60

Lon Fuller required that laws be coherent, prospective rather than retrospective, public,

possible to comply with, reasonably certain and stable in their content, and general in their
application. LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (revsd edn, 1969) ch 2; MJ Radin, ‘Reconsidering the
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Whether one focuses on the rule of law in law-making or in adjudication, independent
courts are typically given a central role. In his definition of the rule of law, Albert
Venn Dicey emphasized the importance of the ‘ordinary courts’, by which he meant
(rather parochially) the superior courts of England and Wales, whose independence
was advanced, among other things, by objective safeguards to protect against outside
interference. Joseph Raz noted on judicial independence and the rule of law that ‘the
court’s judgment establishes conclusively what is the law in the case before it’ and
that, without an independent adjudicator, ‘people will only be able to be guided by
their guesses as to what the courts are likely to do, but these guesses will not be based
on the law but on other considerations’. 64 Along the same lines, consider the
following comment by Hayek on law-making and the courts: 65

In theory, at least, it is still unquestioned doctrine that the law ought to be
general, equal, and certain, and that it ought to be administered by independent
judges. This involves not only . . . some degree of separation of powers and
the recognition of the principle of nulla poena sine lege, but also quite
generally that government can not coerce the private citizen in the service of
the momentary goals of its policy, but only where it is required by the general
rules of law. Indeed . . . the independent judge is not supposed to be concerned
with the particular ends the government is pursuing or even to know about
them.

These references convey that a commitment to the rule of law in law-making
generally, as well as in the specific instance of adjudicative decision-making, is tied to
the independence of the courts. 66 On the other hand, where the rules in a supposedly
rules-based system are subject to an adjudicative process that lacks independence, it is
difficult to describe the system as supportive of the rule of law. Likewise, the role of

64
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independent courts is a fundamental, or at least widely assumed, component of
procedural fairness. 67

In domestic law, the adjudicative authority to review the state’s sovereign decisions,
even in its role as ultimate legislator, is assigned to courts so as to insulate that review
function from other powers. 68 According to Peter Russell: ‘the case for subjecting
government itself . . . to legal limits on its authority’ is based on the liberal rule of law
premise that ‘disputes about whether the non-judicial branches of government have
exercised their powers in a manner authorized by law must be decided by judges those
branches do not control’. 69 To further this separation, and to ensure public confidence,
objective safeguards of independence were extended historically to the judicial office.
These include the safeguards of appointment of the judge for a set tenure; prohibitions
on removal from office other than for cause; guarantees of the judicial salary; 70 and
assurances of administrative independence, including control by a court of its docket,
assignment of judges to specific cases, and so on. 71 The presence of these safeguards
establishes an institutional foundation for the special capacity and legitimacy of
judges both to resolve disputes between parties and to review other public decisions.
Courts are usually not accountable to a general electorate or staffed by experts in
specific fields of regulation. Their conventional strength, creating their ‘special
competence to interpret public values embodied in authoritative texts’, 72 lies in a
process that allows for the presentation of evidence and argument by those affected by
a decision, that leads to the carefully reasoned evaluation of claims, and that is based
on both a detachment from the specific dispute and an institutional separation from
other actors.
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The importance of judicial independence is recognized in the many international
courts and tribunals that exist beyond investor-state arbitration, including those with
jurisdiction and effective power over disputes that arise from regulatory relations
between states and individuals. This is the case, in particular, at the European Court of
Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, and the International Criminal Court, at which judges are appointed for terms
of six to nine years, are subject to restrictions on outside activities that would be
incompatible with judicial independence and impartiality as determined by the
respective court, and are assigned to specific cases by objective methods such as
seniority or rotation. 73 The common element with domestic courts is that the final
word on the resolution of specific claims, and the corresponding determination of
public law, lies with a decision-maker which enjoys a range of safeguards for its
institutional independence and thus an objectively verifiable capacity for fair
decision-making.

The longstanding importance of judicial independence is demonstrated by the (here,
common law) origins of judicial security of tenure. In England, security of tenure is
understood to have originated in the Act of Settlement of 1701 which provided (as of
1714) that judges could no longer be removed at the pleasure of the King, but only on
approval of both Houses of Parliament. 74 This was a covenant of the Glorious
Revolution and it was achieved only after hard experience in which, for example, Sir
Edward Coke—then Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas—stood up to
73
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James I by refusing to submit the courts to an over-ride by the King and was
dismissed from office for doing so. 75 This basis for preserving judicial independence
was extended in 1760, when existing judicial appointments were allowed to continue
beyond the death of the ruling King or Queen. Provisions for security of tenure were
later incorporated into the US constitution 76 and into the constitutions of many other
countries 77 as a basis for the separation of the judicial power. 78 In The Federalist
Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote of the ‘permanent tenure of judicial officers’ that
‘nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which
must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty’. 79 Security of
tenure and a guaranteed judicial salary have been described as ‘cardinal centricities of
judicial independence’ 80 and as ‘an original principle in the basic customary law of
the constitution’, whether expressed in an ordinary statute or explicitly in the
constitution. 81

Despite its origins in the formal separation of powers, security of tenure also insulates
judges from inappropriate influence by other powerful actors, such as the church,
officials of other states or international organizations, and private interests. 82 With
respect to private interests, the influence of transnational firms—the most prominent
and powerful foreign investors in the present system—has become more relevant as
globalization has accelerated and its impacts have deepened. These actors have the
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potential not only to ‘shape global regulatory regimes’ 83 but also to influence courts
directly in the judicial review of state decision-making. 84 On this, Shimon Shetreet
wrote in 1976: 85

Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom from
interference by the executive or legislature in the exercise of the judicial
function . . . In modern times, with the steady growth of corporate giants, it is
of utmost importance that the independence of the judiciary from business or
corporate interests should also be secured. In short, independence of the
judiciary implies not only that a judge be free from governmental and political
pressure and political entanglement but also that he should be removed from
financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to
affect him in the exercise of his judicial function.

IV Concerns about Independence in Investment Treaty Arbitration

The absence of security of tenure and other safeguards in investment treaty
arbitration, due to its uniqueness as a form of public law arbitration, is important
because it raises a serious concern about bias in the system. In particular, it founds an
apprehension of bias in favour of claimants (especially where they are likely repeat
players or otherwise heavy consumers of legal and arbitration services) and, more
specifically, in favour of those states that wield major power over appointing
authorities or the system as a whole. In turn, respondent states in general, as well as
those investors who bring claims against such powerful states, are likely to be
disadvantaged unfairly. This is so for two main reasons. First, based on their
governance structure and distribution of voting power, many of the entities that
exercise appointing authority under the treaties appear very likely to favour the
priorities of major capital-exporting states or foreign investors, or both. Secondly,
where only one class of parties brings the claims (in this case investors), arbitrators
appointed on a case-by-case basis may be suspected of favouring that class of parties
83
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in order to promote the system and their position within it. Both issues arise from the
fact that the arbitrators are appointed on a case-by-case basis and that they typically
derive extensive business income from professional services supplied to powerful
actors outside the adjudicative function.

A. The Inappropriate Influence of Appointing Authorities

Because investment treaty arbitrators are appointed case-by-case, obvious questions
arise about the role of appointing authorities under investment treaties. The appointing
authorities exercise various discretionary powers, including the power to appoint the
presiding arbitrator where the disputing parties (or party-appointed arbitrators) do not
agree on who to appoint, the power to appoint a party-appointed arbitrator where the
relevant party does not do so, the power to decide challenges alleging a conflict of
interest on the part of an arbitrator (or to determine who should resolve such
challenges), and—pursuant to the ICSID Convention—the power to appoint all three
members of an annulment tribunal.86

Where an adjudicator lacks secure tenure, the appointing authority obviously has
much greater influence over how the adjudicative process will unfold, case to case,
than where the appointment is made once and for a lengthy period. In the latter
circumstance, an appointing authority will no doubt consider how a judicial
appointment is likely to alter the ideological inclinations of the bench over a judge’s
term of office, for example. 87 But the authority is in a position to act on these
preferences only at the time of appointment; it cannot adjust its decision on an
ongoing basis as it learns of specific claims, the identity of the claimant or respondent,
86
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the issues raised, the implications of a potential decision, the impact on the appointing
authority and its associates, and so on. With case-by-case appointments, an appointing
authority is in a position to do all of these things. This is not to say that the resulting
decision will necessarily have been based on improper considerations. But it may
have been, and clearly the authority is in a far stronger position to manage the
allocation of adjudicative power within the system—so as to accentuate disciplines on
some states and alleviate them for others, for instance—than if objective safeguards of
independence were present. The fact that this is possible in itself founds a credible
suspicion of bias. Simply put, case-by-case appointment may be seen to operate in
favour of those who wield power in the appointing authority at the expense of those
who do not.

To whom are these powers allocated under investment treaties? One would expect
that in an impartial and independent system these powers would be assigned to an
entity that was reasonably free of apparent bias in favour of investor or state interests
(or particular investor or state interests). This is arguably so under the few investment
treaties 88 that allocate appointing authority to judges of the International Court of
Justice. 89 However, under the great majority of investment treaties, the designated
appointing authority leans heavily towards the priorities of the major Western capitalexporting states or international business.

Often the authority lies with the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), at which the relevant powers are held by the Chair of
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the ICSID Administrative Council 90 or by the ICSID Secretary General. 91 Both are
executive officials in an international organization. The former is an ex officio
position of the World Bank President who is by convention a US national, 92
nominated by the US government and confirmed by the Bank’s Board of Directors at
which roughly 60 per cent of the voting power is held by Executive Directors of
eleven major capital-exporting states. 93 The ICSID Secretary General, conventionally
the World Bank’s Legal Vice President and General Counsel, although now a separate
officer, 94 is a person nominated by the World Bank President and approved by a twothirds vote of the Administrative Council where states vote on the basis of one vote
per member. 95 Thus, appointing authority at ICSID is vested in (1) an official who is
customarily chosen by the US Administration with the concurrence of other major
capital-exporting states or (2) a person nominated by the official referred to in (1)
with the concurrence of the state parties to the ICSID Convention. 96 The difficulty
with this is that, given its nomination arrangements, its weighted voting, and its
governance structure, it is difficult for an informed outsider to conclude with
90
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confidence that ICSID will be free of improper bias in favour of certain states or of
the private interests that those states favour. 97

These concerns would remain, but would be less acute, if ICSID were to appoint the
adjudicators for a set term, of say seven years, as at other international adjudicative
bodies that hear claims by individuals in the regulatory sphere, as well as in the case
of domestic courts (although the domestic standards are more rigorous, in that judicial
tenure is typically granted for life or until a set retirement age). 98 The concerns would
be alleviated further if ICSID appointments were for non-renewable terms; if the
adjudicators were assigned in an objective way to specific cases; and if appointments
took place as part of a wider process involving discussion of possible candidates
among regional groupings of states, with an opportunity for capital-exporters and
capital-importers alike to influence the decision. Jan Paulsson criticizes this statebased model of appointments (with particular reference to the WTO Appellate Body)
as lacking in legitimacy because it involves the appointment of tribunal members
‘through the political processes of an international organization’. 99 But it is difficult to
understand how case-by-case appointments at ICSID (or other appointing authorities
in the system) can be described differently, except by noting the more serious failure
at ICSID to provide security of tenure for those who are appointed and the
consequently more pervasive role of ICSID’s own political processes.

Even so, ICSID is arguably better positioned to make these decisions than other
appointing authorities in the system. ICSID is at least accountable to states, most of
which are electoral democracies, and its process is relatively open in that: (1) ICSID
publicizes the existence of ICSID claims by investors and the identity of arbitrators
appointed; (2) ICSID appoints from a roster of arbitrators set by the state parties to the
97
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ICSID Convention (although there remains no objective method of assignment to
specific cases, and the current roster is too large to make such a process feasible); (3)
ICSID decisions are usually released to the public (at least in part); and (4) ICSID
annulment tribunals give reasons for their decisions on impartiality challenges to
arbitrators. It is doubtful that these characteristics satisfy the standards of openness
and accountability of domestic or international courts, but they at least allow a degree
of scrutiny of ICSID decision-making that is absent for other appointing authorities
acting pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, the Rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC Rules), and the Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCC Rules), in particular.

More troubling is the powerful role that is played under some investment treaties by
private organizations, accountable directly to business interests rather than a public
body, that do not provide even the most basic assurances of openness and
accountability. For example, many treaties 100 assign appointing authority to the ICC.
Under the ICC Rules, arbitrators are appointed by the ICC’s International ‘Court’ 101
of Arbitration, the members of which are chosen by the ICC world council of business
on the recommendation of the ICC Executive Board. 102 The ICC Rules themselves are
under the custody of the ICC and are subject to change according to the ICC’s
processes (and power relations), beyond the control of the state parties to investment
treaties. The ICC has described itself on its website as ‘the world business
organization’, as ‘the voice of world business’, and as an organization that ‘speaks for
100
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world business whenever governments make decisions that crucially affect corporate
strategies and the bottom line’. 103 This demonstrates the obvious point that the ICC is
a business organization whose purpose is to further the interests of its membership,
much of which consists of foreign investors that have brought or that might bring a
claim under an investment treaty, that regularly negotiate investment contracts
containing arbitration clauses, that hire ICC officials (including arbitrators) as
advisers, and so on. 104

It is reasonable, then, to suspect that ICC officials, when appointing arbitrators to
specific cases or when resolving conflict of interest claims against arbitrators, will
tend to favour the interests of investors, on whose behalf the ICC works and lobbies,
over the regulatory priorities of states. Where the president of an international
tribunal, appointed to decide key questions of public law, is chosen by an arm of the
ICC, it is indeed difficult to describe this as anything other than an utter failure to
ensure judicial independence ‘from business and corporate interests’ and to insulate
the adjudicator from ‘financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather
to seem to affect him in the exercise of his judicial function’. 105 An analogous
situation in the US context might involve a takings dispute between a business entity
and a state government being resolved, not by the Supreme Court, but by an
arbitration tribunal, the presiding member of which was appointed by the US
Chamber of Commerce. To describe this as an independent arrangement for the
adjudication of public law would be untenable.

Because of the role played in the system by organizations likely to favour major
states or international business—combined with the use of adjudication to make
final decisions about matters of great importance to states and their people—the
lack of objective safeguards in investment treaty arbitration undermines the
claims that the system delivers a fair, rules-based process. According to
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Alexander Hamilton: 106 ‘If the power of making [periodical judicial
appointments] was committed either to the executive or legislature there would
be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to
both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either.’ Or as
Lord Denning said, without secure tenure: ‘The judicial power is simply a part
of the executive machine.’ 107 Denning was speaking of the domestic separation
of powers, but it is reasonable to expect that executive officials at international
organizations, whether private or state-based, are also subject to the power
dynamics of their own executive machine.

B. The Inappropriate Influence of Private Parties

Security of tenure serves also to insulate adjudicators from powerful private interests.
As such, it is a means to ensure that no one can claim credibly that a judge decided a
dispute or interpreted the law in order to further his or her own financial
opportunities. The absence of this and other safeguards in investment treaty
arbitration re-introduces various questions about bias. And here the public law
structure of the adjudicative mechanism is particularly relevant. Where only one class
of parties (investors) can bring claims against the other class (states), and not vice
versa, 108 arbitrators have an apparent interest to interpret the law in ways that
facilitate or encourage claims (albeit without undermining the political foundations
for the system’s existence). If the arbitrator identifies his or her own interests with
those of the arbitration industry—a reasonable assumption in many cases—then he or
she may be motivated (or feel obliged) to resolve disputes and interpret the law in
ways that grow the arbitration industry, enhance his or her status among gatekeepers
within it, and encourage powerful states to value the system so as not to jeopardize the
industry’s role.

On the difficulty with using arbitration to resolve finally questions of public law, a
stark warning is provided by Yves Dezaley and Brant Garth’s classic empirical study
106

Hamilton (n 70 above) 471.

107

Denning (n 75 above) 1.
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of the international arbitration industry. 109 Although their research did not focus
specifically on investment treaty arbitration and its unique characteristics, Dezaley
and Garth’s findings indicate that competitive pressures in the arbitration industry
pose a threat to independence in public law adjudication, all the more so in a system
that involves case-by-case appointments and asymmetrical claims. Relevant
observations in their study, which was based on extensive interviews with participants
in the arbitration industry, include the following:

The operation of the market in the selection of arbitrators . . . provides a key to
understanding the justice that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators. 110
The new generation of [arbitration] technocrats . . . emphasizes their ability to
satisfy the consumers in order to gain repeat business. 111

For the lawyers and their justice, the question is how to affirm the autonomy
necessary for legitimacy while at the same time manifesting sufficient fidelity
to the economic powers who must in the end find these services worth
purchasing and deploying. 112

It is good arbitration politics to thank business lawyers or other acquaintances
who bring nice arbitration matters by letting them have limited access to the
arbitration market. This system of exchange of favors is essential to success in
arbitration, a career dependent on personal relations. 113

The growth of the market in arbitration is also evident in the competition that
can be seen among different national approaches and centers. 114
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They [the newcomer arbitrators of the 1980s and 1990s] present themselves . .
. as international arbitration professionals, and also as entrepreneurs selling
their services to business practitioners . . . 115

The ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] has . . . become one of the
principal places where the ‘politics’ of arbitration is elaborated and expressed.
There are innumerable committees and multiple networks of influence that
gravitate around this institution. The [ICC International Court of Arbitration],
for example, which is really an oversight committee that reviews arbitration
appointments and decisions, appears to be particularly sensitive to the business
clientele . . . 116

The multinational companies are in this way investing in the construction of
these legal services that serve them. 117

These findings convey the fact that arbitrators operate in a marketplace in which each
supplier of the ‘symbolic capital’ arising from individual reputations has an interest to
further his or her own position and that of the industry as a whole. 118 The industry
consists of networks of cross-connected players. They affiliate around prominent
centres of arbitration such as the ICC. Prominent arbitrators may name each other for
appointments and exclude those who are not accepted within the culture. With the
passing of the old generation of gentleman arbitrators, the new technocrats are more
likely to have an orientation that differentiates and promotes their industry in relation
to its competitors (here, domestic courts and international diplomacy). 119 Because
arbitrators can earn income from activities beyond the adjudicative role, including
from the private practice of investment law, the industry encompasses—although to
varying degrees—not only the arbitrators themselves, but also the lawyers and
aspiring arbitrators working in or around the system and the assorted experts and
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commentators who seek work as expert witnesses, advisers, or arbitrators. 120
Prominent players often sit as arbitrators while advising and representing claimants or
respondents and while promoting arbitration clauses in investment contracts, treaties,
or arbitration rules. 121

It must be obvious to anyone working in the industry, as to the informed outsider, that
investment arbitration will not thrive unless businesses that own assets abroad
consider it worthwhile to bring claims, and unless powerful states continue to see
benefits in the system so as not to pull the plug on it. 122 One would expect, then, that
the ‘economic powers’ demanding appeasement by the industry include claimants
(investors), especially repeat players or firms that negotiate arbitration clauses in their
contracts, as well as the major players in appointing authorities. That said, arbitrators
can also be expected to avoid favouring blatantly the system’s consumers or overseers
in order to protect their claims to autonomy and legitimacy. 123 How arbitrators choose
to present themselves as ‘entrepreneurs selling their services’ is likely to depend on
the relevant sub-market for appointments (ie investors, states, one or more appointing
authorities, or a combination). And, as the degree of connection will vary between
individual arbitrators and particular arbitration centres or the industry as a whole, so
too will the degree of apparent financial or career-related pressure. 124 Nevertheless,
all arbitrators who aspire to future business will have reason to promote the system
among prospective claimants while defending it from rejection by the most powerful
states.
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This provides a basis for suspicion about inappropriate bias in the system. It raises
precisely the sorts of concerns that safeguards of independence seek to dispel by
removing adjudicators from the market and by positioning them instead as members
of a separate institution. As Lederman put it in 1976: ‘The conditions on which
[judges] hold office mean that they have no personal career interest to be served by
the way they go in deciding cases that come before them.’ 125 In the absence of the
safeguards, the career interests return with a vengeance, with major consequence in
the adjudication of public law.

C. Actual versus Perceived Bias

Some have argued that concerns about apparent bias in investment treaty arbitration
are misplaced because there is no proof of actual bias in the system. This response
misconstrues the standards of independence that apply to judges and typically to other
adjudicators. It is rarely if ever a requirement in adjudication that actual bias be
proven in order to disqualify an adjudicator (although proof of actual bias will of
course suffice to disqualify). Rather, the requirement is for an absence of an
unacceptable ‘apprehension’ of bias, or ‘appearance’ or ‘suspicion’ or ‘danger’ of
bias, 126 so as to recognize that the absence of actual bias, while vital, is not enough.
What is also required is a sound basis for an informed outsider to conclude that the
adjudicator is sufficiently insulated from inappropriate bias. Where to draw the line as
to what perceptions constitute a sufficient basis for doubt may depend on various
factors. 127 But only in highly extraordinary circumstances—perhaps where an
available pool of expert commercial adjudicators consisted of only one or a few
people in a small sector in which everyone worked very closely together—might
proof of actual bias be the sole basis for questioning independence.

125

Lederman (n 81 above) 11.

126

eg R v Gough [1993] 2 All ER 724; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial

Court (n 70 above) paras 111–12; Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63;
[2000] 205 CR 337. H-L Yu and L Shore, ‘Independence, Impartiality, and Immunity of
Arbitrators’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 935, 937.
127

See discussion at n 42 above, and accompanying text.

<Schill, Chapter 20>

34
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales explained the concern for perceived bias,
as well as actual bias, in the Locabail decision: 128

. . . objections and applications based on what, in the case law, is called ‘actual
bias’ are very rare, partly (as we trust) because the existence of actual bias is
very rare, but partly for other reasons also. The proof of actual bias is very
difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge
about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common
law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a
real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually
exists.

This highlights two problems with a reliance on proof of actual bias as the basis for
establishing independence. First, it is unrealistic to expect a party to be able to
establish actual bias given the obvious difficulties of doing so. Secondly, it would be
unbecoming of the adjudicative process to compel the adjudicator to testify as to his
or her state of mind, opinions, etc. Thus, in the well-known words of Lord Hewart, ‘it
is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’. 129 In
this respect, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada requires ‘that the court or
tribunal be reasonably perceived as independent’ and explains that: ‘The reason for
this additional requirement was that the guarantee of judicial independence has the
goal not only of ensuring that justice is done in individual cases, but also of ensuring
public confidence in the justice system.’ 130

Assessing whether a reasonable perception of bias exists requires one to consider
indicators of possible bias on the part of the individual adjudicator.131 That is, are
there any direct or indirect connections between the individual adjudicator and other
128
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interests that raise a concern? Is there evidence of an attitudinal bias arising from what
the individual has said or written in the past? Was the individual previously involved
in the dispute or in relevant decision-making involving a disputing party? These sorts
of questions are addressed or alluded to in many arbitrator codes of conduct 132 and in
the submissions made when investment treaty arbitrators are challenged by a
disputing party. What one does not see in investment treaty arbitration, but what one
should expect when adjudication is used to decide public law, are the safeguards that
apply to courts when they are called on to resolve questions of public law. The need
for these safeguards ‘follows from the fact that independence is status oriented; the
objective guarantees define that status’. 133 Different jurisdictions frame such
requirements in different ways, but the safeguards themselves are widely recognized
in the liberal democratic tradition of judicial review. 134 They are also widely
recognized in statements of international organizations135 and in the founding
instruments of international courts 136 as central components of judicial independence.
They do not guarantee judicial purity of mind and complete freedom from

132

eg IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 22 May 2004,

explanation to General Standard 1, referring to ‘justifiable doubts’ as to the arbitrator’s ‘ability to
be impartial or independent’.
133

Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (n 70 above) para 112,

referencing Valente (n 130 above) paras 15, 22.
134

Russell (n 69 above) 1.

135

UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United

Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August–
6 September 1985; endorsed by GA Res 40/32 and 40/146, UN GAOR, 40th Sess, UN Doc
A/RES/40/32 and A/RES/40/146 (1985)), Arts 2, 11–15; Report of the United Nations Secretary
General on the Rule of Law and Transnational Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
UNSG Report S/2004/616 (2004) 4.
136

ECHR (n 73 above) Arts 21–3; Treaty of Rome (n 73 above) Art 223; Protocol on the

Statute of the Court of the European Economic Community, Art 4; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (n 73 above) Arts 35–6, 40, 46; Statute of the International Court of
Justice (26 June 1945), Arts 13(1), 16, and 18(1); WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art
17(2).

<Schill, Chapter 20>

36
inappropriate influence. 137 But they are nonetheless widely accepted to be
institutional preconditions. 138

D. Empirical Study of Actual Bias

A series of related arguments have been made to the effect that the experience in
investment treaty arbitration to date reveals the system to be neutral and independent.
For instance, it is sometimes said that claimants are frequently unsuccessful and that,
even where the claimant is successful, the outcome is usually an award of only a
proportion of the compensation originally claimed. Not having analysed the data
systematically, I myself would have guessed that tribunals decline jurisdiction in
about 20 per cent of cases and find in favour of the claimant in about 50 per cent of
the remaining cases, although in a significant minority of these cases the amount
awarded is not more than a few million dollars. A more rigorous study of seventynine publicly-available awards found that ICSID tribunals rarely declined to hear
claims on jurisdictional grounds, that investors who negotiated host-country consents
to ICSID jurisdiction on their own initiative [i.e. pursuant to a contract] hurt their
claims’ ability to withstand objections for lack of jurisdiction, and that investors from
the richest countries had the most success in securing ICSID jurisdiction. 139 In two
detailed studies, Susan Franck found that investors were successful and received
damages in twenty of the fifty-two final awards reviewed 140 and that, in forty-two
137
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cases reviewed, there was no statistically significant association between the OECD
status or income-level of the state of nationality of a tribunal’s presiding arbitrator and
certain adjudicative outcomes for OECD/non-OECD states or for states with varying
income levels. 141

Some of the findings in the limited empirical work to date thus appear to support the
prospect of some sort of bias within the system in favour of claimants and powerful
states, while others appear to refute it. None offers compelling evidence in either
respect, however. This is partly due to the limitations of the relevant studies; their
necessarily limited samples fall short of what would be required for generalizable
results, and the parameters of Franck’s study did not account for in-group
heterogeneity of OECD countries, in particular. 142 More fundamentally, it is simply
very difficult to answer empirically whether claimants or states, or particular players
within those categories, would be more or less likely to succeed under a court-based
model rather than arbitration, and whether major issues would be decided differently
by judges as opposed to arbitrators. Empirical work, quantitative and qualitative, 143 is
useful and illuminating of expectations about adjudicative tendencies, but, because we
are dealing with complex decision-making in circumstances where there can be no
controlled comparator, efforts to prove or disprove actual bias will lead, at best, to
tentative findings. 144 Indeed, for this very reason, standards of adjudicative
independence demand the absence of perceived bias as well as actual bias.
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E. Existing Protections within in the System

In a recent article, Charles Brower and Stephan Schill responded in detail to concerns
about apparent bias in investment treaty arbitration. 145 One of their main points 146
was that the argument that there is such a concern ‘disregards that arbitrators are
impartial and independent dispute resolvers who interpret and apply the governing
law and are subject to a number of mechanisms that can prevent private interests from
145
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function of the arbitrators and the degree to which it resembles judicial review. More importantly,
even if one agrees with Brower and Schill’s answer on this point—by putting investment treaty
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argue that the institutional position of the arbitrators should be evaluated against the safeguards
that apply to public courts. Brower and Schill’s claim in no way removes the concern that
investment treaty arbitrators are vulnerable, like judges or other public office holders, to
inappropriate influence from within or outside government, if not protected by the relevant
safeguards.
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taking precedence over public interests’. 147 They emphasized that investment treaty
arbitrators are subject to ‘several formal and informal mechanisms that ensure the
impartiality and independence of arbitrators’. 148 Among these, they refer to the duty
of arbitrators to disclose information that may reveal impartiality, the ability of a
disputing party to challenge an arbitrator’s appointment before a domestic court,
appointing authority, or arbitral institution, and the possibility for public scrutiny
based on the dissemination of awards in professional communities and online.

Each of these mechanisms is important to assuage concern about bias. But all apply
also in the case of independent courts that decide public law. They are, as such,
complementary to and not substitutes for the other safeguards that courts enjoy. One
would not say that an automobile was roadworthy because it had an engine, brakes,
and chassis, but no wheels or windows. All of a series of components may be
essential for the operation of the whole. And, as widely recognized, safeguards like
security of tenure are critical preconditions—though not absolute guarantees—to the
assurance of judicial independence. To withdraw these components, even while
leaving others in place, is to dilute the standard. Brower and Schill’s counterargument, in essence, does not justify the removal of objective safeguards in the case
of investment treaty arbitrators. It is really a claim that arbitrators should be subject to
a lower standard than the domestic and international courts which carry out similar
functions. 149

Of particular importance for Brower and Schill as a means to protect against
impartiality are the reputations of arbitrators and the point that ‘appointments . . . are
essentially merit-based’ in that ‘the crucial factor for appointment is not the possible
or real bias of an arbitrator’ but rather ‘his or her reputation for impartial and
independent judgement’. 150 An investment treaty arbitrator’s reputation, say Brower
and Schill, ‘is too fragile to risk by biased decisionmaking and therefore works as a
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control mechanism that ensures the arbitrators’ independence and impartiality’. 151
The difficulty with this point is that, for anyone who must think about how to secure
appointments or advance the industry, the key reputational concern is one’s status
among those with power over appointments and over the wider success of the
industry. In investment treaty arbitration, the actors who wield such power cannot be
assumed by the outsider to prefer an impartial and independent approach to the
resolution of all investor-state disputes. It is likely, rather, that they will prefer
approaches that accord with their own interests. Referring to the market for ‘meritbased’ appointments is thus another way of describing how arbitrators will strive to
appease those who have influence in the appointing authorities and over the industry.
It is precisely this concern of the untenured adjudicator for his or her reputation in the
marketplace that undermines the claim to independence. 152

V. Conclusion

Some proponents of investment treaty arbitration are quick to judge the substantive
choices of states but reluctant to acknowledge the procedural failings of investment
treaty arbitration. Above all, there is a tendency to downplay the system’s inattention
to well-known safeguards of judicial independence. Yet to defend investment treaty
arbitration as a rule of law-based alternative to domestic courts and to international
diplomacy is to convey a high expectation of fairness in the system. The process is
adjudicative; it is used to decide public law; it is highly determinative; it involves the
review of legislative and judicial decisions as well as broad policy decisions of the
executive; it circumvents domestic remedies; it leads to state liability involving
potentially vast sums; it triggers coercive enforcement in many countries; it may lead
to severe losses for investors whose claims fail or who face a costs award. Thus, it is
problematic to make the rule of law argument and then to argue that—despite all
this—the system need not satisfy the standards of independence that ensure fairness in
courts carrying out similar functions.
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To be clear, the argument in the present chapter is not a criticism of international
courts and tribunals that enjoy safeguards of independence, such as the International
Court of Justice, the European Courts, or the WTO Appellate Body. Some would
strive to tie the fate of investment treaty tribunals to that of other ‘international courts
and tribunals’ which must ‘defend themselves on a regular basis against attacks on
their legitimacy as mechanisms for resolving disputes about the scope and limits of
state sovereignty’. 153 But this is really an attempt to divert attention from the decision
of states to replace courts with arbitrators by highlighting instead a wider debate 154
about the appropriate relationship between states and international adjudication. The
argument here engages the former issue, not the latter, in that it criticizes investment
treaty arbitration for its failure to provide adequate assurances of judicial
independence.

Advocates for the system face a quandary. They must support adjudication, asserting
its superiority over institutional alternatives in making regulatory choices. But they
must defend a particular form of adjudication that eschews the hallmarks of judicial
independence. By implication, many rule of law-based defences of the system seek to
impose a set of policy prescriptions on some but not all states and to ensure rigorous
protections for some but not all foreign investors. Where one or another state or
investor stands in the system—in terms of the degree of discipline to which it will be
subjected or the level of protection it can expect—will depend on one’s estimation of
the attitudes of the relevant appointing authority and of gatekeepers among the
arbitrators. Ultimately, the interests of some are likely to be prioritized in ways that
are unfair to others. Of course, reasonable people may differ on whether the apparent
bias—arising from the allocation of appointing power within ICSID or the ICC, or
from the status of claimants within the arbitration industry—seriously erodes the
legitimacy of the system as a whole. But, at the very least, the inattention paid by
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many proponents of the system to its institutional failings undermines the normative
case that they espouse.
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